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CONSUMER PROTECTION CHOICE OF LAW: 
EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 
JAMES J. HEALY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the choice-of-law analysis of consumer 
contracts is governed generally by the Second Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws. According to §187, the “chosen law” in a contract 
will be applied unless the application of that law would violate a 
fundamental public policy of that state.1 Unfortunately, American 
courts applying this method have produced inconsistent 
interpretations of consumer contracts,2 since not all courts have been 
willing to use the public policy exception to offer consumers the 
protections of the laws of their home state. The United States would 
be well served to look at Europe’s example of consumer contract 
interpretation to develop a more uniform and consistent legal 
approach that honors the protections of consumers’ home state laws. 
Under Council Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), consumers in Europe are 
permitted to select the applicable law of a contract, to the extent that 
the protections under the selected law do not derogate from the 
protections of the laws of their home jurisdiction.3 Adopting this 
approach in the United States would not only further the goals of 
protecting consumers in America but would also encourage consumer 
confidence in cross-border transactions. In addition, such a change 
would provide U.S. courts with a straightforward choice-of-law model 
 
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2009; A.B. Cornell University, 2006. I would 
like to thank Professor Ralf Michaels for introducing me to this topic and for his guidance 
throughout the writing process. In addition, I very much appreciate the editing assistance from 
the editors of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. All remaining errors are 
my own. Special thanks to my family for their love and support. 
 1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC) [hereinafter Rome I 
Regulation]. 
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that encourages consistency and reliability in judicial interpretations 
of choice-of-law provisions in consumer contracts. 
Part I of this note explores consumer protection choice-of-law in 
America under §187. The selected cases illustrate the inconsistency of 
the application of home-state protections to consumer litigants in 
U.S. courts. Part II examines the European conflicts approach for 
consumer contracts to help understand the benefits and drawbacks of 
the Rome I approach. Finally, in part III, this Note analyzes whether 
a new American approach based on the European model would offer 
a more predictable and consistent methodology for interpreting 
choice-of-law provisions in consumer contracts. 
I. AMERICAN COURTS HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT IN 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS BY ENFORCING THE LAWS OF 
THEIR HOME STATES 
Though not always applied with the same degree of uniformity, 
American courts examining the “public policy” exception sometimes 
look to the same goal as European system: protecting consumers 
from a choice of law that is detrimental to the protections their home 
jurisdiction’s laws and customs allow.4 Under the Second Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws § 187(2), the state law chosen by the parties to 
govern a contract will be applied unless the selected state lacks a 
“substantial relationship” to the parties or the transaction or the 
application of the chosen state’s law “would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state . . . which, under § 188, would be the state of the 
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
parties.”5 Similarly, prior to the 2001 revisions,6 the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) permitted parties to a transaction to 
select the law of any state or nation to which the transaction “bears a 
reasonable relation.”7 
 
 4. See infra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1)-(2) (1971). 
 6. This aspect of choice of law for American consumers has been the subject of attempted 
reforms to adopt a more European approach. See infra Part III. For the new section which 
replaced U.C.C. § 1-105, see U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(1) (2003). 
 7. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977). 
HEALY_FMT2.DOC 4/27/2009  2:18:57 PM 
2009] CONSUMER PROTECTION CHOICE OF LAW 537 
At its core, § 187 aims to protect both consumer and state 
interests.8 The Restatement provides that “chosen law should not be 
applied without regard for the interests of the state which would be 
the state of the applicable law . . . in the absence of an effective choice 
by the parties.”9 These state interests affect consumer interests 
because the “[p]rime objectives of contract law are to protect the 
justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them 
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under 
the contract.”10 Thus, the Restatement uses the interests of the state 
as means to protect the expectations of contracting parties. 
However, some American courts have not followed these 
principles embodied in the Restatement. In particular, parties to an 
agreement have not been able to “foretell with accuracy”11 their rights 
and protections under contract, since some American courts have 
given consumers the protection of the laws of their home state while 
others have denied such protections to similarly-situated consumers. 
Section A below examines the general application of the 
fundamental public policy exception. Sections B and C examine the 
inconsistent application of this exception in applying the home state 
protections for consumers in the areas of class action waivers and 
credit card contracts, respectively. These examples are particularly 
pertinent because a substantial amount of jurisprudence exists in 
these two areas, which constitute a growing portion of cross-border 
transactions involving American consumers. These specific examples 
are indicative of the larger problem with American consumer 
conflicts law, namely that consumers are not treated consistently 
under the fundamental public policy exception. 
A. General Application of Fundamental Public Policy Exception 
If an American court finds that a choice of law violates a 
fundamental public policy, the Restatement empowers the court to 
decline to apply the chosen law.12 However, the scope of the public 
policy exception has not been interpreted on a consistent basis. While 
some U.S. courts have referred to the fundamental public policy 
 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (“Fulfillment of the 
parties' expectations is not the only value in contract law; regard must also be had for state 
interest and for state regulation.”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. cmt. e. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187. 
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exception of §187(2) as “broad,”13 other courts have taken the 
opposite approach, applying the exception only in “extremely 
limited” circumstances.14 Since courts have divergent views regarding 
the scope of the exception it is little wonder that they have produced 
inconsistent results. 
The standards used by courts to determine whether a policy is 
fundamental are similarly vague. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming looked to §187 and declared that it “[would] not apply 
foreign law when it is contrary to the law, public policy, or the general 
interests of Wyoming’s citizens.”15 This standard shows that the 
criteria for whether a policy is a fundamental one can be vague and 
inconsistent. Without further specificity, the “general interests” of a 
state’s citizens will be of little assistance in guiding the choice-of-law 
analysis toward a uniform application. For example, Wyoming’s high 
court decided in favor of a defendant company and enforced the 
chosen law of a contract, finding that no fundamental policies were 
implicated simply because the laws of Wyoming and Pennsylvania 
were “similar.”16 But the fundamental public policy exception is not 
meant to serve as a proxy for similarity in state laws. The 
Restatement provides that a difference in results of state laws should 
not alone implicate the existence of a fundamental policy.17 
Without a clear understanding of what constitutes a fundamental 
policy and how the analysis should be conducted, consumers in 
America will be unable to predict whether courts will apply the 
chosen law of the contract. A consumer hoping for the protections of 
their home jurisdiction’s laws must hope to find themselves before a 
judge who sympathizes with their “general interests.” 
B. Class Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts 
When evaluating choice-of-law questions with regard to class 
action waivers in consumer contracts, American courts have used 
different justifications and rationales. These divergent approaches 
have lead to a wide range of results, leaving only some consumers 
with the protections of their home-state laws. 
 
 13. See Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 921 A.2d 799, 805 (Md. 2007). 
 14. See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 332 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 933 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 15. Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher, 924 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1996). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g. 
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1. Fundamental Public Policy used to Protect Consumers 
At the state and federal levels, some courts have undertaken 
choice-of-law analyses that ensure consumers receive the protections 
of their home states. However, even though these courts reach a 
similar result, they often employ different justifications. In Aral v. 
Earthlink,18 a California state appellate court applied California law to 
allow for a private class action suit against an internet service 
provider by its former customers. Since Earthlink’s principal place of 
business was in Georgia, the court found that § 187 provided a 
reasonable basis for the choice of Georgia law, which permitted the 
waiver of class action suits in consumer contracts.19 However, the 
court noted that class action waivers were frowned upon by the laws 
and policies of California.20 In fact, the court went as far as to say that 
the fundamental policy at issue was not only the right to pursue class 
action remedies, but also “the right of California to ensure that its 
citizens have a viable forum in which to recover minor amounts of 
money allegedly obtained in violation of [state unfair competition 
laws].”21 More specifically, the court said that the policy was 
fundamental since application of the chosen law would act to deprive 
consumers of any realistic opportunity to recover small sums that 
were obtained by fraud.22 Thus, the court here afforded California 
consumers the protection of the laws and policies of their native state, 
even where the selection of another state’s laws would have been a 
valid choice of law to govern the contract. 
Yet, the court’s decision to protect consumers went further than 
simply allowing consumers to rely on the laws of their home state. 
This court explicitly relied on the right of the state itself to provide 
for a process that allows its citizens to recover against unfair 
competition on the part of a commercial seller.23 Presumably, the 
choice-of-law analysis did not turn on a court merely selecting its own 
public policy over that of another state but was influenced by the 
pronouncement that a state could determine the minimum 
protections that it would afford its citizens when they act as 
consumers in an interstate transaction. 
 
 18. 134 Cal. App. 4th 544 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 19. Id. at 564. 
 20. Id. at 554-57. 
 21. Id. at 564. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
HEALY_FMT2.DOC 4/27/2009  2:18:57 PM 
540 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:535 
The same court in California was presented with another class 
action waiver choice-of-law question in Klussman v. Cross Country 
Bank24 and again resolved the question in favor of the consumer’s 
home-state laws.25 In refusing to enforce the class action waiver 
provision in a consumer contract with a national company, the court 
held that the right to seek redress as a class was “more than a mere 
procedural device in California” and that the rejection of class action 
waivers in California was based on public policy expressions against 
that practice in state statutes.26 The court pointed to many 
justifications in favor of class-action consumer litigation, including 
facilitating efficient consumer recovery from fraudulent business 
practices, assisting lawful businesses by curtailing unscrupulous 
competitors, and consolidating the litigation of multiple identical 
claims.27 Thus, the prohibition of class actions, which function as 
procedural mechanisms that benefit the entire court system, was 
interpreted to be in violation of “fundamental fairness and public 
policy.”28 
However, this court went further than simply looking to state 
consumer protection laws. Instead, the court offered an additional 
rationale in support of protecting class claimants – the orderly 
functioning of the judicial system. By declining to enforce the 
provision on the grounds that it violated a fundamental public policy, 
the court not only afforded the consumer the statutory protections of 
their home jurisdiction but also the benefits obtained from the 
underlying goals of these protections, specifically the ability to 
recover against fraudulent commercial sellers. 
Other courts have employed different justifications in choice of 
law analyses that offer consumers the protection of their home state 
laws. When faced with a class action waiver in a telephone contract 
that would have been valid under New York law, the Supreme Court 
of Washington refused to enforce the contract on the grounds of 
fundamental public policy.29 The court recognized that the question of 
whether a class action waiver amounted to a fundamental public 
policy was a different inquiry than whether such a waiver was 
 
 24. 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 25. See id. at 1300. 
 26. Id. at 1296. 
 27. Id. at 1294 (quoting American Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001)). 
 28. Id. at 1295. 
 29. See McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 852 (Wash. 2008). 
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substantively unconscionable.30 In examining previous cases applying 
the state’s Consumer Protection Act, Washington’s high court found 
that the policy favoring adjudication of small claims in the class 
context was a fundamental one.31 Yet this court based its decision not 
on state statute alone but also on general concepts of consumer 
protection. The court reasoned that “protecting parties in a position 
of weaker bargaining power from exploitation” is the type of 
fundamental public policy that is implicated by § 187.32 In essence, the 
underlying motivation for the state law—here, the protection of the 
weaker party in a consumer transaction—formed the basis for 
concluding that the state’s policy against class action waivers 
amounted to a fundamental rule. 
Examples where American courts provided consumers with the 
protections and policies of their home states are not limited to state 
courts. In Douglas v. District Court,33 customers filed a class action 
lawsuit in federal court to challenge a phone company’s attempt to 
alter the terms of the contract unilaterally.34 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested that the customers could not 
be subjected to the revised terms of the contract, in part because the 
revised agreement would be unconscionable in California and thus 
contrary to that state’s fundamental public policy.35 The court relied 
upon California decisions that rejected the idea that alternative 
service options could provide the sole grounds to survive a claim for 
unconscionability of a contract.36 Since a class action waiver could be 
unconscionable under California law, this court found that the 
availability of other services would not foreclose the action brought 
by the class claimants.37 As in the above cases discussing class action 
waivers, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas applied the home-state 
protections to consumers on the basis of both the applicable laws of 
their home jurisdictions and the closely held principle that the 
availability of substitute services should not insulate otherwise unfair 
commercial arrangements. 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 34. See id. at 1066. 
 35. See id. at 1067. 
 36. Id. at 1068 (citing Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc)). 
 37. See id. 
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2. Courts Decline to Protect Consumers through Fundamental 
Public Policy 
Notwithstanding the above examples, courts in other cases have 
not found that class action waivers constitute a fundamental public 
policy and have declined to extend home-state protections to the 
consumers who brought suit. One example is Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court,38 where a consumer contested the decision by the 
credit card company to amend the terms of the agreement and add a 
class action waiver to the contract.39 That court sought guidance from 
the state’s highest court, which directed that when such a waiver was 
present in a consumer contract of adhesion where one party with 
greater bargaining power “has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers . . . such waivers are 
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”40 
Despite this pronouncement, however, the lower court decided that 
the substantive law of Delaware should apply.41 
Discover Bank was decided within about a week of both Aral 
and Klussman by the very same court.42 While the latter two cases 
relied on the unconscionability of class action waivers and applied 
California law to protect home state consumers, the same court in 
Discover Bank took an entirely different course of action. The stated 
reason for this departure was that the single plaintiff in Discover 
Bank, as opposed to the class represented by the plaintiffs in both 
Aral and Klussman, was asserting claims on the basis of Delaware 
laws and on behalf of consumers everywhere, instead of just 
California residents.43 Although the plaintiff in Discover Bank was 
also a resident of the state of California, the court thought less of the 
wide-ranging policies—the orderly administration of justice in 
California courts, the availability of claims for consumers who fall 
victim to fraud, and the need for the state to create a viable forum for 
consumers to recover against unfair competition—espoused in Aral 
and Klussman as the basis for those decisions. The fact that the same 
court within such a short span of time decided similar cases 
differently demonstrates the inconsistency of the approach. When 
 
 38. 134 Cal. App. 4th 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 39. Id. at 889. 
 40. Id. at 894. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Aral was decided on November 29, 2005, Klussman on December 15, 2005, and 
Discover Bank on December 7, 2005. 
 43. See Discover Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 895. 
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similarly situated claimants receive different protections from the 
same court under the fundamental public policy analysis, the logical 
conclusion is that a more predictable choice-of-law approach is 
necessary. 
C. Credit Card Agreements 
The inconsistency in choice-of-law analysis in class action waivers 
is also present in the treatment of credit card agreements in American 
courts. Many states have taken steps to regulate credit card 
agreements and practices in order to shield consumers from unfair 
business practices.44 As a result, this area of the law is an important 
aspect of consumer protection in the United States. As with class 
action waivers, American courts have sometimes protected 
consumers by applying the laws of their home states. However, courts 
have also failed to extend this protection to similarly situated 
claimants on other occasions. 
1. Fundamental Public Policy used to Protect Consumers 
On some occasions, courts have interpreted the fundamental 
public policy exception to protect consumers by applying the laws of 
their home states. For example, in Coady v. Cross Country Bank,45 
cardholders challenged a credit card company for illegal debt 
collection practices, including allegations of threats, harassing phone 
calls, and obscene language by the company’s representatives.46 
Though the plaintiffs were residents of Wisconsin, the agreement 
provided for Delaware law to govern the contract.47 The Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin decided that statutory protections afforded to 
state residents under the Wisconsin Consumer Act amounted to an 
important public policy.48 The court invalidated this contract in part 
because the choice-of-law provision in the agreement effectively 
prevented the plaintiffs from asserting any of the protections, claims, 
or remedies that Wisconsin law provided to them.49 The choice-of-law 
clause was coupled with an arbitration clause, which the court viewed 
 
 44. See Jeffrey I. Langer & Kathleen E. Keest, Interest Rate Regulation Developments in 
1995: Continuing Liberalization of State Credit Card Laws and “Non-Filing” Insurance as 
“Interest” Under State Usury Laws, 51 BUS. LAW. 887 (1996). 
 45. 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). 
 46. Id. at 736. 
 47. See id. at 735-36. 
 48. See id. at 737. 
 49. See id. at 739. 
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as a device to limit the substantive laws applicable to any consumer 
claim to those of Delaware and federal law only.50 This limitation on 
the type of relief available to consumers seemed to be a strong 
motivation in this court’s choice of law decision. 
In sum, the problem with this choice-of-law provision was not 
that the chosen law (Delaware) contained provisions which ran 
contrary to a fundamental public policy of Wisconsin. Instead, the 
court decided that the fundamental policy implicated in this dispute 
was Wisconsin’s consumer protection scheme to protect its residents 
from unfair lending practices.51 
2. Courts Decline to Protect Consumers through Fundamental 
Public Policy 
However, not all courts have used the fundamental public policy 
exception to protect consumers in credit card contract disputes. 
Unlike Coady, where the Wisconsin court assumed that the mere 
existence of a statute constituted a fundamental public policy,52 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, 
Inc.53 decided that the fundamental public policy question regarding 
credit card holders turned on whether a consumer protection statute 
could constitute a fundamental public policy.54 The Maryland court 
determined that the existence of a similar statute did not create a 
fundamental public policy.55 Maryland state law imposed several 
restraints on credit card companies, including requiring the signature 
of the cardholder, limiting the maximum allowable interest rate, and 
requiring that certain information be disclosed to the cardholder.56 In 
Jackson, the plaintiff contended that the card issuer had violated the 
applicable Maryland laws by failing to make a reasonable attempt to 
obtain her signature on the agreement.57 As the court considered 
whether to apply Maryland law or the contract’s chosen law, South 
Dakota, it looked to whether the Maryland law amounted to a 
 
 50. Id. at 740. 
 51. Id. at 740-41 (“The clause violates an important state public policy as embodied in the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act because it bars the plaintiffs from asserting any claims or seeking any 
remedies under the Act.”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. 921 A.2d 799 (Md. 2007). 
 54. See id. at 805. 
 55. See Jackson, 921 A.2d at 808. 
 56. Id. at 800. 
 57. Id. at 799. 
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fundamental public policy.58 The court looked to its previous case law, 
under which courts in Maryland applied a lex loci contractus 
approach,59 and determined that the law did not constitute 
fundamental public policy.60 
Leaving aside the problems inherent in the court’s decision to 
combine a conflicts analysis using both the Second Restatement and 
lex loci, the Jackson case provides an example of the unpredictable 
nature of the fundamental public policy exception. While a Wisconsin 
consumer, like that in Coady, can rely on a state statutory consumer 
protection initiative to protect her interests from a detrimental 
chosen law, a Maryland consumer cannot. Instead, under Jackson, a 
Maryland cardholder would benefit from the protection of her home 
state’s laws only if the law on which she relied was one of enough 
importance that her state’s courts would deem it to be fundamental. 
Though the two statutes appear to function similarly in the different 
states, one court decided it to be a fundamental policy while the other 
did not. These differences among states, as well as the difficulty in 
determining whether a law might rise to fundamental importance, 
make relying on this choice-of-law approach problematic. Ultimately, 
consumers are left to suffer from these unpredictable results. 
The unpredictability in choice-of-law analysis of credit card 
agreements is not limited to state courts. In Vigil v. Sears National 
Bank,61 a consumer in Louisiana challenged the contract governing 
her credit card agreement, which contained a choice-of-law provision 
specifying that the contract had been entered into in Arizona and that 
the laws of that state would govern.62 The plaintiff’s suit relied on 
Louisiana state consumer law, which directed courts to invalidate 
consumer credit transactions where the consumer consented to the 
jurisdiction and fixed venue of another state,63 but the federal district 
court determined that Louisiana’s laws did not allow for an 
invalidation of this contractual provision.64 In another case, Gay v. 
CreditInform, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
declined to offer a consumer the protections of his home-state laws 
 
 58. Id. at 805. 
 59. See id. (recognizing that the lex loci contractus approach will apply the law of the place 
where the transaction occurred, unless that decision would be dangerous to public policy). 
 60. See id. at 808. 
 61. 205 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D. La. 2002). 
 62. See id. at 569. 
 63. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3511(c) (2001)). 
 64. Id. 
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against a credit card corporation.65 The Pennsylvania plaintiff alleged 
that a branch of the Capital One credit card company had violated 
Pennsylvania state credit repair regulations66 that gave consumers the 
right to bring claims against a credit provider in a judicial forum.67 
The contract’s arbitration provision was valid under the Virginia law 
stipulated by the contract, and would prevent a consumer from 
bringing the suit authorized under Pennsylvania law.68 Despite 
recognizing that Pennsylvania had “an interest in protecting its 
consumers,” the court determined that applying Virginia law, instead 
of the law of the consumer’s home state, would not violate a 
fundamental public policy of Pennsylvania.69 Thus, Vigil and Gay 
provide two additional examples where courts have held that 
statutory consumer protection regimes do not constitute fundamental 
public policies. This inconsistency deprives consumers of the 
predictability and confidence that is necessary to conduct cross-
border transactions. 
II: CONSUMER PROTECTION CHOICE OF LAW IN EUROPE: 
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Generally, European courts will not enforce a law selection 
clause if doing so would ignore the binding laws of the consumer’s 
native jurisdiction. Though premised on the concept of choice, the 
European choice-of-law rules, at their core, have aimed to protect the 
weaker party in consumer transactions.70 In 1979, the European Court 
of Justice in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) overturned a German regulation 
prohibiting the sale of drinks of a certain alcoholic content, implicitly 
deciding that member states should mutually recognize the laws of 
other states.71 This decision was later extended from production 
standards to services and represents an obligation on states to 
recognize foreign law, especially when that law concerns the country 
 
 65. See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 374. 
 67. Id. at 376. 
 68. Id. at 390. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Dennis Solomon, The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe: Advances 
and Retreats, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1717 (2008). 
 71. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis 
de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
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of origin of one of the parties.72 This development of the concept of 
free movement influenced the European approach to permitting 
consumer choice. While consumer choice became the “guiding 
principle” of European consumer law,73 particular rules were 
developed for some contracts where it was generally accepted that 
one party to the contract required some level of additional 
protection.74 The European development of specific contract laws in 
the consumer protection context is one such area. 
Section A below traces the development of the rules regarding 
contractual obligations in Europe and the special approach taken to 
consumer protection. Section B discusses the applications of Europe’s 
choice-of-law approach. Finally, section C analyzes the criticisms and 
possible shortcomings of the European rule. 
A. Development of Europe’s Approach to Consumer Contracts 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome Convention)75 took effect within Europe in 1980.76 
The ability of parties to stipulate to a choice of law was one of the 
basic rules of the Rome Convention, which explicitly states that “[a] 
contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”77 Yet the 
extent of such choice was limited in some contexts, including those 
relating to consumer transactions and employment contracts.78 
Specifically, Article 5 provides that a selection could “not have the 
result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by 
the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his 
habitual residence,” subject to requirement that the seller was 
essentially doing business in that jurisdiction.79 In sum, the Rome 
Convention showed that the importance of contractual choice in 
Europe functioned only to an extent in the consumer protection 
 
 72. See Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
1607, 1626 (2008). 
 73. Gert Straetmans, The Consumer Concept in EC Law, in ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 295, 303 (Johan Meeusen, Marta 
Pertegás & Gert Straetmans eds., 2004). 
 74. Solomon, supra note 70, at 1717. 
 75. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature 
June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
 76. Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International 
Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (2008). 
 77. Rome Convention, supra note 75, art. 3. 
 78. Id. arts. 5-6. 
 79. Id. art. 5. 
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context. The rules governing consumer contracts provide a greater 
degree of protection to consumers by limiting contractual choice so 
that consumers cannot select a set of laws that would deprive them of 
the protections of their home laws.80 
As the Rome Convention gave way to the Rome I regulation,81 
the various drafts of rules applicable to consumer contracts evinced 
these concerns about balancing consumer choice with the protection 
of the weaker party. Originally, the Rome I regulation guaranteed 
consumers the protection of their home state laws by preventing them 
from choosing a governing law for the contract.82 In the first proposed 
draft of the regulation, the law applicable to consumer contracts in 
Article 5(1) read: “Consumer contracts . . . shall be governed by the 
law of the Member State in which the consumer has his habitual 
residence.”83 This approach sought to strengthen the rights of 
consumers and limit the ability of large companies to choose a 
favorable set of laws and impose them across the European Union 
through choice-of-law clauses in cross-border consumer contracts.84 
The Rome I proposal also contained a habitual residence exception to 
the mandatory home-state rules. The habitual residence requirement 
applied where the professional seller pursues commercial activities in 
that jurisdiction.85 A seller was only excused from this requirement if 
it was unaware of the consumer’s home state and this lack of 
knowledge was not the result of the seller’s own negligence.86 
In response to the initial Rome I proposal, the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) reviewed the first draft and 
published a response.87 Regarding Article 5 and the proposed rules on 
consumer contracts, the EESC described the new rules as “a 
thorough reworking” and praised the regulations as a “step in the 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 3. 
 82. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at 16, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 
15, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Answer of Ms. Kuneva to Written Question: E-1751/2007, June 13, 2007, http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2007-1751&language=EN. 
 85. See Commission Proposal, supra note 82, at 16. 
 86. See id. See also Answer of Ms. Kuneva to Written Question: E-1751/2007, supra note 84 
(noting that this was the “only exception” to the rule that the law of the consumer’s habitual 
residence must apply to consumer transactions). 
 87. See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), 2006 O.J. (C 318) 56. 
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right direction.”88 The committee supported the idea of protecting 
consumers by providing them with the protection of their home-state 
laws, since such laws would likely be most familiar to consumers and 
in their native language, and thus would make it easier to obtain legal 
advice.89 However, the EESC questioned the wisdom of eliminating 
all opportunities for the consumers to choose the laws governing 
contracts.90 Instead, the committee believed that consumers would 
benefit from the ability to select the applicable law, so long as 
“certain protective measures” were in place to protect the party to the 
transaction who is presumably less experienced and possesses weaker 
bargaining power.91 The EESC urged subsequent revisions to the 
Rome I proposal reflecting this recommendation.92 
The European Parliament shared these concerns and suggested 
to amend the Rome I regulations accordingly.93 In the amendments to 
Article 5, the European Parliament proposed that 5(1) still require 
that a commercial contract be “governed by the law of the country 
where the consumer has his or her habitual residence.”94 But Article 
5(2) was changed to allow parties to choose the law applicable to the 
contract, so long as that choice would not “have the result of 
depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by such 
provisions that cannot be derogated from by contract by virtue of the 
law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on 
the basis of [Article 5(1)].”95 These proposed changes were eventually 
adopted and are reflected in the final text of the Rome I regulations.96 
Thus, the legislative history of Rome I demonstrates that both 
safeguarding consumer choice and protecting the weaker parties to 
such transactions were the primary purposes behind the various drafts 
of the consumer contracts rule. While consumer choice was seen as an 
important freedom-of-contract principle, it was deemed essential in 
the consumer contracts context that this freedom to select the 
applicable law be coupled with certain protections. This approach 
 
 88. Id. § 3.3.1. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Comm. on Legal Affairs, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Law Applicable to Consumer Contractual Obligations 
(Rome I), U.N. Doc. A6-0450/2007 (Nov. 21, 2007) (prepared by Cristian Dumitrescu). 
 94. Id. at 28. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Rome I Regulation, supra note 3. 
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does not permit consumers to select (either intentionally or at the 
suggestion of a sophisticated commercial seller) the laws of another 
jurisdiction that deprive them of the benefits and protections they 
have come to know and expect in the state of habitual residence. 
B. Application of Rome I in the Consumer Protection Context 
Under the Rome I regulation, consumers are protected by the 
application of the laws of their habitual residence so long as the other 
party—the “professional” acting in furtherance of a professional 
trade—pursued these commercial activities in that consumer’s home 
country.97 If a company advertises or holds itself out for business in a 
jurisdiction, a consumer who resides in that state is entitled to the 
protection of those laws.98 Therefore, Europe has chosen to provide a 
basic guarantee to consumers who enter into contracts with 
professional sellers. These requirements show that home law 
protection is not boundless but is instead based on the expectation of 
reasonable corporate and consumer actions. Consumers that contract 
within their home jurisdictions are entitled to the protection of those 
laws.  Similarly, sellers are responsible for complying with the laws of 
those states where they advertise or conduct business. Any consumer 
contract, therefore, cannot abrogate those protections under 
Europe’s choice-of-law analysis. Thus, Rome I has allowed for a more 
consistent choice-of-law system for consumer protection in Europe.99 
The judicial application of the European approach to consumer 
choice shows that it would be a good development for the United 
States. European courts have generally considered the mandatory 
provisions of the consumer’s home country to apply when the parties 
choose a foreign law.100 The German Federal Court invalidated a 
credit contract between an Austrian bank and a German customer 
that was to be governed by Austrian law.101 The German Federal 
Court held that German provisions against doorstop-selling remained 
applicable for the German consumer under the rules of the 
 
 97. Id. art. 6(1)(a)-(b). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Solomon, supra note 70, at 1719. 
 100. Jürgen Basedow, Consumer Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a Future Rome I 
Regulation, in ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I 269, 280 (Johan 
Meeusen, Marta Pertegás & Gert Straetmans eds., 2004). 
 101. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 26, 1993, IPRspr., 
1993, No. 37, 97). 
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predecessor to Article 5(2) in Rome I.102 Since German laws provided 
this protection for habitual residents of that country, the court 
interpreted those protections as ones that could not be abrogated by a 
choice of another state’s law. Another court invalidated a contract 
that selected English law to apply to a futures transaction with a 
German consumer, since the protection under the British regulations 
was considerably lower than the consumer protection under the 
German laws.103 In essence, European courts have approached the 
rules from the standpoint of protecting consumers with the 
protections of their home laws. The European Court of Justice, for 
example, has developed a model of consumer protection choice-of-
law in which the “reasonably well informed and reasonable observant 
and circumspect consumer” will prevail.104 
The European consumer rules also act in conjunction with a 
variety of Directives that affect the Community’s choice-of-law 
approach. One such Directive, governing distance contracts, notes the 
wide variance in protections afforded by different jurisdictions and 
articulates a need for a minimum level of common rules that would 
protect consumers.105 In addition, the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive states that a contract term that is not individually 
negotiated is unfair if it runs contrary to the requirement of good 
faith and “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer.”106 These directives are based on the idea that the 
confidence of consumers will be strengthened when they expect equal 
rights and remedies regardless of where the transaction took place.107 
Thus, the European approach of providing for basic and predictable 
rules on which consumers can rely not only protects consumers in the 
 
 102. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 26, 1993, IPRspr., 
1993, No. 37, 97). 
 103. Id. at 281 (citing Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Trial Court for Criminal Matters] 
Dusseldorf, Mar. 8, 1996, IPRspr., 1996, No. 144, 347). 
 104. Straetmans, supra note 73, at 303 (citing Case C-126/91, Yves Rocher, 1993 E.C.R. I-
2361). 
 105. Council Directive 97/7 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance 
Contracts, pmbl., 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EU). 
 106. Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 
095) 29 (EC). 
 107. See Cristina Poncibò, The Challenge of EC Consumer Law 3 (European Univ. Inst., 
Max Weber Programme Working Paper, MWP No. 2007/24, 2007). 
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conduct of modern transactions, but also benefits the market by 
ensuring greater consumer confidence.108 
C. Criticisms and Possible Shortcomings of European Approach 
Commentators have not been uniformly supportive of Europe’s 
choice-of-law approach to consumer protection. Supportive 
commentators have observed, for example, that its “practical 
approach . . . will lead to the same results [preferred] by academic 
writers in most cases, but it has the advantage of speed and low 
costs.”109 The critics, however, view European law as granting 
excessive protection to consumers and being too liberal with the 
interpretation of choice-of-law clauses.110 Consumer contract law 
under Rome I might benefit from a more explicit definition of the 
consumer concept and also from a limitation that the rules only apply 
in business-to-consumer contracts. 
Some case law has developed that could suggest the Rome I 
consumer protection approach is too precise. The Gran Canaria 
Cases, decided in German courts, concerned the marketing strategies 
employed by a Spanish company at German tourists.111 The sales 
contracts were written in German, for goods to be delivered in 
Germany, and the consumers were spoken to in German, but the 
transaction was to be governed by the laws of the Isle of Man. At the 
time, Spain had not yet implemented some consumer protection 
directives.112 The Bundesgerichtshof held that the choice-of-law clause 
in these contracts was valid because the contract concerned 
immovable property, not goods or services.113 The Gran Canaria Cases 
suggest that Rome I is not a perfect fit for all cases, since the 
consumers should have been the beneficiaries of their home state 
protections. Broader consumer contract rules would have allowed for 
their application in this instance. 
Despite these shortcomings, European consumer protection 
conflicts jurisprudence can still serve as a model for positive 
improvements in the American system. American choice of law with 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. Basedow, supra note 100, at 281. 
 110. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 70, at 1740. 
 111. Basedow, supra note 100, at 276 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Mar. 19, 1997, IPRspr., 1997, No. 34). 
 112. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 19, 1997, IPRspr., 
1997, No. 34). 
 113. Id. at 276-77. 
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regard to consumer contracts could benefit from a more European 
approach by allowing consumers the freedom to contract, qualified by 
an important protective measure that would not deprive them of the 
laws of their home state. In addition, such a system would have the 
added benefit of bringing clarity and consistency to a field of law that 
has seen little certainty under the current application of § 187 and the 
fundamental public policy analysis.114 
III: POSSIBLE REFORM OF AMERICAN CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW IN LIGHT OF EUROPEAN LAW 
Based on the European experience, the United States would be 
well served to adopt a conflicts regime that applies specifically to 
consumer contracts. This proposal would be most effective if it 
permitted a limited amount of consumer choice. As such, a new 
regime should ensure that consumers could not choose the laws of 
another American state or foreign country that would deny them 
protections afforded by the state laws of their legal residence. By 
doing so, the United States would not only implement the concept 
underlying the European approach—encouraging choice but 
protecting the weaker party in a consumer transaction—but would 
also develop a rule that functions more consistently than the current 
fundamental public policy approach. 
Also, the new approach should incorporate Rome I’s limitation 
that companies must be advertising or otherwise holding themselves 
out for business in jurisdictions before consumers can have the 
benefits of those laws. In carving out a conflicts approach for one 
specific type of contract, it would be important to make sure that the 
rule reaches only the types of consumer transactions that require 
protection of the weaker party. By limiting its application to 
consumer-seller agreements, this approach would learn not only from 
the benefits of the European approach but also from its shortcomings. 
Thus, adopting a rule in the same basic vein as Rome I that contains 
several improvements and limitations would allow the United States 
to improve its overall approach to choice of law in the consumer 
protection context. 
This idea highlights a major difference between the European 
and American approaches: consumer contracts in Europe are 
evaluated through their own specific category of rules while 
American law tends to treat consumer agreements through the 
 
 114. See supra Part I. 
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traditional choice-of-law approach to contracts. Still, American courts 
should provide a degree of protection to consumers by ensuring that a 
contractual choice does not derogate from the protections afforded 
by the laws of their home state. 
Legislators implementing this approach could also learn from the 
lessons of a failed attempt to import European concepts to the 
American choice-of-law structure in the recent revision of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). While some scholars believe 
that the failure of recent modifications to the U.C.C. in the United 
States might counsel against an approach based on Rome I and 
mandatory norms,115 several of the criticisms of the U.C.C. revision, 
including the opposition from commercial interests and the perceived 
danger of corporations applying their own law at the expense of 
consumers, would be avoided under an approach that more closely 
parallels Rome I. As described above, an approach that accounts for 
the primary goals of the Rome I regulation—permitting consumer 
choice but safeguarding the protections of home state laws—and 
implements some limitations on the scope of the rule would offer the 
United States a more palatable form of the European approach to 
choice of law in consumer contracts. 
In revising the choice-of-law provisions of the U.C.C., the 
drafters of the proposed modifications looked to the European 
approach in the Rome Convention.116 Section 1-105 allowed the 
parties to a transaction to select the law of any state that bore a 
“reasonable relation” to the transaction.117 In 2001, the drafters sought 
to import the European mandatory rule concepts by offering 
proposed Section 1-301.118 This new section still allowed parties to 
choose any law that bore a “reasonable relationship” to the 
transaction119 but had specific rules if one of the parties to the 
transaction is a consumer. Looking to the Rome Convention,120 the 
drafters of this section required that the application of the chosen law 
“not deprive the consumer of the protection of any rule of law . . . 
which both is protective of consumers and may not be varied by 
agreement,” including the law of the consumer’s home state.121 The 
 
 115. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1657. 
 116. See id. at 1656. 
 117. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1989). 
 118. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656. 
 119. U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(1). 
 120. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656. 
 121. U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(2). 
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influence of the European model on the new revision to the U.C.C. is 
clear because the new regulation allowed consumers the freedom to 
select the law governing a commercial transaction but prevented them 
from derogating from the protections of their home state laws. 
However, new Section 1-301 did not enjoy widespread 
acceptance. In fact, the new provision “produced almost no positive 
results”122 and only the Virgin Islands adopted it in full.123 Twenty-one 
state legislatures introduced bills to adopt the new section, but no 
bills were adopted.124 Of the fourteen states that adopted a majority of 
the proposed reforms, each one decided not to adopt Section 1-301.125 
Patrick Borchers describes this failure of proposed Section 1-301 in 
the United States as evidence that America is not receptive to 
European rules that exempt consumers from choice-of-law clauses 
that derogate from the protections offered by their home states.126 But 
the substance of the debate surrounding proposed Section 1-301 
shows that its rejection was instead the product of several competing 
considerations. 
Since proposed Section 1-301 was aimed at consumer protection, 
it naturally drew criticism from industry groups.127 In addition, 
commercial entities worried that moving away from the “reasonable 
relation” approach in favor of consumer-oriented protections would 
bring greater complexity to the process of reviewing contracts and 
thus add significant costs to consumer transactions.128 Such costs 
would be mitigated by a Rome I-type of approach, wherein sellers are 
responsible for the laws of the habitual residence of the consumer if 
the seller advertises or holds itself out for business in that 
jurisdiction.129 At worst, a national company in the United States 
would have to ensure that its choice of law would not derogate from 
the protections offered to consumers in any of those states. 
Complying with the differing state-level regulations in the 
consumer protection context is an exercise that large companies 
 
 122. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1656. 
 123. Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised 
U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 59 (2005). 
 124. Id. at 59-60. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Borchers, supra note 76, at 1657. 
 127. See Graves, supra note 123, at 61. 
 128. See, e.g., Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, Proposed 
Amendment to UCC Article 1-Section 301: Choice of Law, available at http://www.ucita.com/ 
Legislation.htm [hereinafter Fair Electronic Commerce]. 
 129. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 6(1)(a)-(b). 
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marketing their products in America already undertake. For example, 
the German car manufacturer BMW, which markets and sells cars all 
across the United States, adopted a policy for all American imports 
governing the disclosure of pre-sale repairs to new automobiles that 
incurred damage in transit.130 BMW looked to the consumer 
protections laws in each state and decided to set its company policy at 
the level of the most stringent jurisdiction, which in this case required 
disclosure of repairs which cost more than three percent of the 
suggested retail price of the automobile.131 While BMW or any other 
national company might incur costs and legal fees in determining the 
most stringent consumer requirements with regard to their 
transactions, the BMW policy is evidence that such an undertaking is 
already a part of the normal course of nationwide business in 
America. For companies that target consumers in a multitude of 
states, the idea of complying with consumer regulations in those 
jurisdictions is hardly a new concept. 
A related, but similarly unfounded, concern with proposed 
Section 1-301 was the fear that a seller could rely on this provision to 
incorporate the protection of the laws of their own jurisdiction into a 
contract with a consumer, and thereby impose one state’s laws on 
consumers across the country.132 However, such a situation could not 
occur under the basic rules of Rome I and this fear misunderstands 
Section 1-301. As indicated earlier, such an approach would 
specifically prescribe that the selection of a foreign law would not 
have the effect of depriving the consumer of any protections offered 
by the jurisdiction where the consumer resides. Thus, it would seem 
that the commercial seller would be unable, under a Rome I-type 
rule, to rely on the protections afforded by its home jurisdiction, and 
would instead be bound by the protections afforded to its customer 
under that customer’s native laws. Including a more specific 
stipulation that only a consumer can rely on these laws or a more 
 
 130. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563-65 (1996). This case, decided by 
the United States Supreme Court, was a civil fraud action undertaken by a consumer against 
BMW for failing to disclose an instance of pre-sale repairs made to a new car. The Supreme 
Court’s decision focused on the propriety of punitive damages in such a case and what 
constituted a reasonable amount. In their defense at trial and on appeal, BMW described how 
they had reviewed the laws of each state and decided to set their policy to comply with the most 
stringent set of requirements, thereby ensuring compliance with all state laws applicable to their 
American operations. 
 131. Id. at 565. 
 132. See Fair Electronic Commerce, supra note 128 (worrying that, under U.C.C. § 1-301, a 
consumer might “be forced to have the least favorable law in America apply” to the contract). 
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specific definition of consumer would address remaining fears or 
misunderstandings about such a provision. 
In conclusion, the criticisms that arose regarding Section 1-301 
would not constitute an obstacle to a Rome I-type regulation because 
they are not systemic problems with the American legal system. In 
fact, twenty-one state legislatures at the very least considered 
adopting this approach133 before it was withdrawn. This framework 
would not impose an unreasonable burden on commercial actors, 
since they already confront the issues of fifty-state compliance in 
other areas of their businesses, including state administrative and 
statutory consumer protection laws. And while business interests 
presumably would not be in favor of a consumer-friendly change in 
the law, a national-level proposal, resembling Rome I, that addresses 
some concerns about the application of the seller’s home-state laws 
may receive more support. Thus, the failure to adopt Section 1-301 
should not be viewed as an American indictment of any and all 
mandatory norms. Rather, the specific proposal simply failed to gain 
traction in a national debate about the merits of the undertaking. A 
rule that strikes to the heart of the Rome I regulation—ensuring 
consumers are protected by the benefits of their home law—would 
offer an improvement to the consistency and the substance of the 
U.S. choice-of-law approach to consumer contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
A consistent and reliable approach to consumer protection 
choice of law is essential in an increasingly mobile and interconnected 
society. Whatever the merits of the current system, consistency is 
clearly not among them.134 By adopting an approach similar to that of 
Europe, as embodied in Rome I, the United States could take an 
important step toward not only protecting consumers and increasing 
consumer confidence, but also toward developing a more consistent 
application of choice-of-law analysis. 
Under Restatement § 187, American courts currently examine 
whether the application of a chosen law would violate a fundamental 
public policy.135 But American courts have applied this standard 
inconsistently, with only some courts offering consumers the 
 
 133. See Graves, supra note 123, at 59-60. 
 134. See supra Part I. 
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
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protection of the laws of their home jurisdiction.136 Europe’s approach 
under Rome I allows consumers the freedom to select an applicable 
law, provided that such choice would not constitute a derogation from 
the laws that protect them in their home states.137 Though the failed 
proposal to amend the U.C.C. in America has influenced some 
scholars to counsel against a mandatory norms approach in the 
United States, a European type of proposal would not face the same 
criticism if it incorporated the lessons of Rome I.138 Looking to Rome 
I for guidance on this subject would help the United States simplify 
and solidify a more consistent approach to choice-of-law, thereby 
encouraging consumer confidence in a rapidly expanding and ever-
changing global marketplace. 
 
 
 136. See supra Part I. 
 137. Rome I Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5. 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
